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I.

INTRODUCTION

It is commonly believed that the United States Government is spending too much on health care and must constrain
many of its expenditures. To accomplish this, the largest federal health care program, Medicare, has relied primarily on
restructuring the ways in which it pays for medical services.
Specifically, it has adopted payment strategies, such as diagnosis-related group prospective payment for hospitals (DRGPPS), resource-based relative value schedule payment for physicians (RB-RVS), and capitation.' These payment strategies
attempt both to pay for health care services on a per-unit basis
(such as per-hospital admission) and to hold down per-unit
costs. Most of these strategies also define broadly the units of
care paid for (hospital admissions for DRG-PPS, patients for
capitation)-a way of minimizing opportunities for providers to
compensate for reduced prices by increasing volume.
While some of these strategies achieve considerable success in holding down costs, they are not without risks. In particular they increase, on one hand, the potential problem of
professionals and institutions providing more and more units
of services to increase their income, or, on the other, use fewer
resources for each unit of services to reduce their costs. For
example, institutions could react to per-admission payment by
increasing the number of patients they admit and by decreasing the services they provide for each admission. Some of
these responses could result in increased costs. They could
* The author is a professor in the Colleges of Law and of Health and Hospital
Administration at Ohio State University. He is co-author of HEALTH LAW: CASES,
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS, and has written extensively on health care regulation. He
also authored a recent study on Medicare Peer Review Organizations, and has served
as a consultant to the Institute of Medicine.
1. Under a capitation payment system, the HMO is paid a flat rate per patient per
period of time, and must then provide all of the patient's care (or a specified type of
care) for that period of time without additional charge.
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also contribute to patient harm if patients are provided too few
or too many services or services of inadequate quality.
The federal government has in turn established regulatory
programs that rely on payment denial and civil sanctions to
address these pernicious responses to its payment strategies.
The Medicare Utilization and Quality Peer Review Organization (PRO) program is the most important of these programs.
This Article will first examine the problem of health care
cost inflation and the payment strategies the Medicare program has adopted to address that problem. It will then discuss
the perverse incentives that these payment strategies create,
and the role of the PRO program in addressing harmful provider behavior encouraged by those perverse incentives. The
Article examines evidence on whether the PRO program is
succeeding or failing in this mission, and suggests possible
means of improving the effectiveness of the PRO program in
policing cost containment. Specifically, it recommends clarifying and strengthening the deterrent role of the PROs, crafting
PRO procedures to maximize PRO effectiveness, and networking between PROs and other regulatory entities to enhance
PRO effectiveness.
II.

HEALTH CARE COSTS

The United States spends a great deal on medical care. In
1990 we spent an estimated $647 billion on health care--$2,511
per person.2 There is, of course, no "right" amount for a society to spend on health care, but there are clear signs that
Americans are spending too much. We are certainly spending
more than we have ever spent before. Between 1967 and 1990
the proportion of our gross national product spent on health
care grew from 6.3 percent to 12 percent.3 We are also spending more than other nations. In 1987, for example, we spent
11.2 percent of our GNP on health care, contrasted with Canada, which spent 8.6 percent, Germany, which spent 8.2 percent, Japan, which spent 6.8 percent, and the United Kingdom,
which spent 6.1 percent.4 As an example, we spend more on
health care than we do on groceries, owner-occupied housing,
2. Health Care Financing Administration, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HuMAN
SERvicES, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FACT SHEET: STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS 1 (1990)
[hereinafter HHS HCFA].
3. Id.

4. Schieber & Poullier, InternationalHealth Care Expenditure Trends: 1987, 8
HEALTH AFFAIRS 169, 170 (1989).
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5
or transportation.
Government spending, the focus of this Essay, is of particular concern. The Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) estimates that public expenditures on health care
reached $269 billion in 1990, and federal health expenditures
reached $196 billion.' Yet even this level of expenditures falls
far short of the level necessary to meet the health care needs
of all Americans: At least 31.5 million Americans are at any
one time without private or public health insurance.7 These
persons receive far less medical care than the insured population.' If the medical needs of the uninsured are to be met,
additional resources-certainly including additional public
funds-should be made available.' Unless we are to dramatically increase total health care expenditures, therefore, the
cost of existing health care must be controlled before medical
care can be made more widely available.
Well-publicized constraints on public spending, including
public resistance to increased taxes and competing priorities
for available funds, however, necessitate tight control over gov5. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 426 (1990). The fact that we are
spending a lot on health care, of course, does not mean that we should spend less.
Americans also, no doubt, spend a greater proportion of their wealth on recreation or
on luxury items than do the citizens of many other nations and yet, do not fret about
spending "too much" on these things. Rather, we trust people to purchase no more
than they want of these items, given all of their other needs and desires. The markets
for most goods and services operate to ensure that resources are allocated optimally.
Few economists, however, trust the market for health care to operate that way. Too
many factors distort both the demand and supply for health care to have any
confidence that market forces can tell us how much to spend on it. See B. FURROw, S.
JOHNSON, T. JOST, & R. SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAw: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS

396-401 (1987).
6. HHS, HCFA, supra note 2, at 1.
7. BUREAU

OF THE

CENSUS,

U.S.

DEPT. OF COMMERCE,

HEALTH INSURANCE

COVERAGE 1986-88 2 (1990).
8. Hadley, Steinberg & Feder, Comparison of Uninsured and Privately Insured
Patients; Condition on Admission, Resourse Use, and Outcome, 265 J. A.M.A. 374
(1991).
9. The medical needs of Americans are being met to some extent within current
expenditure levels through direct payment by patients, a complex assortment of public
programs and mandates, and widespread cost-shifting by health care institutions and
professionals. But despite these expenditures, many of the medical needs of the
population go unmet. See, e.g., Braveman, Oliva, Miller, Reiker, & Egerter Adverse
Outcomes and Lack of Health InsuranceAmong Newborns in an Eight-County Area of
California, 1982-1986, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 508 (1989); Newacheck, Access to
Ambulatory Care for Poor Persons, 23 HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 401 (1988).
Further, any comprehensive solution to the problem of providing health care to the
uninsured would almost certainly require increased government expenditure, even if
such increases might result in diminished private expenditure.
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ernment health care expenditures. Thus, strategies to control
federal expenditures on health care have played a prominent
role in recent annual federal budget debates.' The Medicare
program, which at $96 billion is the largest and most costly federal health care program," has been a particular focus of
attempts to control health care expenditures.
III.

MEDICARE COST CONTROL STRATEGIES

Much of the growth in the cost of the Medicare program
during the 1960s and 1970s has been attributed to the use by
Medicare of cost- and charge-based reimbursement. Under
these methods, Medicare reimbursed hospitals for their reasonable reported costs, and doctors for their actual or customary
charges up to prevailing community levels.' 2
Cost- and charge-based reimbursement methods proved

spectacularly inflationary. Between 1967 and 1982, payments
for hospital care grew more than elevenfold from $2.8 billion
to $30.9 billion, while payments for physician care and related

services multiplied more than 28 times, from $.43 billion to $12
3
billion.'
10. See Director's Introduction to the New Budget, BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT. FISCAL YEAR 1991, at 5, 15-16 (1990); Rovner, Beneficiaries
Spared Big Cuts in Medicare and Medicaid, 48 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3718 (1990);
Rasky, The Budget Agreement, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1990, at D22. See also Wing,
American Health Policy in the 1980's, 36 CASE W. RES.L. REv. 608 (1986) (discussing
the politics of Medicare cost containment).
11. HHS, HCFA, supra note 2, at 1.
12. See Iglehart, Medicare begins ProspectivePayment of Hospitals, 308 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 1428 (1983); Lave, The Impact of the Medicare Prospective Payment System
and Recommendations for Change, 7 YALE J. REG. 499, 500-505 (1990); Levy, Borowitz,
Jencks, Kay & Williams Impact of the Medicare Fee Schedule on Payments to
Physicians, 264 J. A.M.A. 717, 717 (1990). At the outset, the Medicare program
adopted these reimbursement approaches from Blue Cross and Blue Shield programs,
partly because alternatives were not readily available, and partly because adopting
these familiar and relatively generous approaches seemed necessary to ensure that
providers would accept Medicare patients. T. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE 8390 (1973).
13. HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID DATA
BOOK, Tables 2.10, 2.11 (1988). The growth in the cost of the Medicare program during
this time was attributable to a variety of factors: aging of the population, expansion of
eligibility, increased usage, etc. Available data, however, point to the key role of
reimbursement in encouraging inflation. Between 1967 and 1978, for example, 17
percent of the increase in Medicare hospital expenditures was attributable to an
increase in the number of beneficiaries and 2 percent to increased days of care; about
81.5 percent was due to increases in reimbursement per day. See HEALTH CARE
FINANCIAL

ADMIN.,

MEDICARE:

USE OF

SHORT-STAY

HOSPITALS

BY

AGED AND

DISABLED INPATIENTS 2 (1983) (prepared by M. Ruther). See generally sources cited
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Congress responded to hospital cost inflation by implementing, in 1984, a Diagnosis-Related-Group Prospective Payment System (DRG-PPS).' 4 Under DRG-PPS, Medicare
purchases from a hospital a "product," i.e. the diagnosis and
treatment of a specific condition, such as a heart attack or
ulcer. For this product, DRG-PPS pays a hospital a uniform,
prospectively determined amount on a per-admission basis.
Medicare admissions are first classified considering the admitting diagnosis of the patient and, where relevant, such factors
as secondary diagnoses, the age and sex of the patient, and
whether a surgical procedure was performed. From this classification comes a DRG weight, which is then multiplied by a
standardized amount to determine the reimbursement for a
particular admission. The standardized amount varies with the
hospital's location: large urban, small urban, or rural. Payments for a particular hospital are also adjusted to reflect the
labor costs in the hospital's local area, the capital costs of the
hospital,' 5 the costs of professional educational programs
within the hospital, and special costs of particular categories of
hospitals.'" Finally, some allowance is made for the costs of
particularly expensive ("outlier") cases.
Congress has moved more slowly to get control over physician expenditures. Through the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (OBRA),
Congress attempted first to freeze and then to limit the growth
of physician reimbursement, and to curtail the extent to which
physicians could charge Medicare beneficiaries more than the
Medicare rate for a service.' 7 Nevertheless, expenditures of
Part B of the Medicare program (which pays predominantly
for physician services) grew at a rate three times that of Part
A (which pays for institutional care) between 1985 and 1989,
supra, note 12, further discussing the role of cost- and charge-related reimbursement
in increasing Medicare costs.
14. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 601, 97 Stat. 65, 149
(1983) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1395ww). For descriptions of DRG
reimbursement, see generally COLEMAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF MEDICARE & MEDICAID

REIMBURSEMENT, 21-56 (1990); and Philips & Wineberg, Medicare Prospective
Payment: A Quiet Revolution, 87 W.VA. L. REV. 13, 30-9 (1984).
15. It is the intention of Congress, though, that, in addition, capital costs will be
paid on a uniform prospectively paid basis by the end of 1991. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(g).
16. Examples of such special categories are hospitals that treat a disproportionate
number of disadvantaged patients or that serve as referral centers in rural areas.
17. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9331, 100
Stat. 1874, 2018 (1986); Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2306, 98
Stat. 494, 1070 (1984).
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almost doubling between 1983 and 1988.18 Much of this growth
was due to an increase in the volume and intensity of physician
services provided to Medicare beneficiaries. Even when Congress froze per-service rates, total costs continued to increase
dramatically because beneficiaries were given more services by
physicians. 19
In 1989 Congress moved to control physician expenditures
through the institution of a resource-based relative value physician fee schedule.' When this fee schedule is fully implemented in 1996, Medicare will pay doctors on a predetermined,
per-service basis considering the resources required to produce
each type of service. The factors considered in establishing the
fee schedule will include the time and intensity of physician
labor involved, practice expenses, and malpractice premiums.
Geographic variations in practice expenses will be reflected in
the relative value schedules, but geographic variations in costof-living will be taken into account only partially in determining the cost of physician labor. The 1989 legislation also
strictly limits physicians' ability to charge Medicare beneficiaries more than Medicare payment rates."
As RB-RVS payment will continue to reflect actual physician costs, it does not constitute as dramatic a change as DRGPPS payment did for hospitals. However, Medicare Volume
Performance standards, implemented as a part of RB-RVS,
may eventually have a dramatic impact on physician payments.
On the advice of the Department of Health and Human Services and the Physician Payment Review Commission,22 Con18. PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REV. COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 3-6 (1990)
[hereinafter PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COmMISSION].
19. Id. at 7-9; Mitchell, Wedig & Cromwell, The MedicarePhysician Fee Freeze, 8
HEALTH AFFAIRS 21 (Spring 1989); Iglehart, The New Law on Medicare's Payments to
Physicians, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1247, 1250-51 (1990).
20. Pub. L. 101-239, § 6102, 103 Stat. 2106, 2169 (1989) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395w-4). See Dechene, Reform of Medicare Reimbursement for PhysicianServices,
23 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 33 (1990); Ginsberg, Physician Payment Policy in the lOlst
Congress, 8 HEALTH AFFAIRS 5 (Spring 1989); Ginsberg, LeRoy & Hammons, Medicare
Physician Payment Reform, 9 HEALTH AFFAIRS 178 (Spring 1990) [hereinafter
Ginsberg et al.]; Iglehart, supra note 19; Levy, supra note 12; Symposium, 23 ST. LOUIS
U. L. J. (1990).
21. By 1992, physicians who choose to bill Medicare beneficiaries directly rather
than to participate in the Medicare assignment program, will only be able to bill 115
percent of 95 percent of the fee schedules, or 109.25 percent of the Medicare rate. See
PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REV. COMM'N, supra note 18, at 26-27.
22. The Physician Payment Review Commission is a panel of experts established
by Congress in 1986 to advise it on reforms in the methods used to pay physicians
under the Medicare program.
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gress will annually set target rates for increases in the volume
and intensity of physician services-called volume perform-

ance standards. 23 If the volume of physician services billed to
Medicare grows at a rate exceeding these standards, the
increase in the standardized amount (by which the relative
value schedule is multiplied to yield per-service rates) will be
cut proportionately, thus placing a limit on total expenditures.
Congress has also mandated stepped-up research to develop
practice guidelines in hopes of reaching a consensus as to the
appropriate intensity of services for particular conditions, and
thus, ultimately, to reduce the volume of service increases.2
As an alternative approach to cost control, Medicare has
also encouraged its beneficiaries to enroll in health maintenance organizations (HMOs). The Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 authorized Medicare to enter into
risk contracts with HMOs and Competitive Medical Plans
(CMPs) under which Medicare pays them 95 percent of the
adjusted average per-capita cost paid by Medicare for the care
of comparable non-HMO beneficiaries.25 If this amount
exceeds an HMOs normal adjusted community premium rate,
the HMO must return the difference to enrolled beneficiaries
through increased services or lower premiums. HMOs may
also participate in Medicare on a cost-contract basis. About 1.4
million Medicare beneficiaries currently belong to Medicarefinanced HMOs.
IV.

26

INCENTIVES CREATED BY MEDICARE PAYMENT
STRATEGIES (DESIRED AND UNDESIRED)

The payment strategies just described were crafted to
encourage institutional and professional behavior that would
limit the costs of the Medicare program. But they also can
encourage under- or over-provision of services, in turn increasing Medicare program costs and threatening harm to
beneficiaries.
Under DRG-PPS, for example, hospitals that can dis23. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(f). See PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REV. COMM'N, supra note 18,
at 27-30; Ginsberg, supra note 20, at 182-184.

24. Pub. L. 101-239 § 6103, 103 Stat. 2189 (1989) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 299 (1990)).
25. 42 U.S.C. 1395mm; see Krasner, New Directions in Medicare and Medicaid
Managed Care, 2 MED. STAFF CouNs. 23 (Fall 1988).
26. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE
PAYMENT AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, 106 (1990) [hereinafter ProPAC].
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charge Medicare patients in fewer days than the average
length of stay on which the DRG rate is predicated, or provide
fewer or less costly services to hospitalized Medicare beneficiaries, can keep the difference between the DRG payment and
their cost. Conversely, hospitals that retain patients for longer
than average lengths of stay, or provide more or costlier services to their patients than the norm, will rarely be able to
recover their excess costs from Medicare. Thus, efficient and
waste-avoiding behavior is encouraged. As compared to costbased reimbursement, which rewarded the hospital for using
more resources, DRG-PPS rewards the hospital for using less.
DRG-PPS appears to have been quite successful as a cost
control strategy. The rate of increase in inpatient hospital
costs, which stood at 19.8 percent in 1981, fell to a historic low
of 3.1 percent in 1987, before climbing again to 7.8 percent in
1989. 7 It now appears that actual costs of Medicare Part A for
1990 will be, when totaled, $18 billion less than those the trustees of the Medicare Hospital Insurance Trust Fund predicted
for 1990 in the late 1970s and early 1980s before PPS was
introduced.2 8
Nothing in the DRG system itself, however, guarantees
that cost cutting by hospitals will stop at the point where the
patient is provided the optimal amount of services for economical, yet effective, care. Indeed, absent constraints external to
the DRG system, the incentives it creates would drive a hospital to use fewer and fewer resources per-admission to permit a
greater and greater profit.' Thus, possible products of DRGPPS reimbursement include premature discharges of patients,
provision of insufficient medical care to patients while hospitalized, and "dumping" of patients who are likely to require
27. Id., Table 4-7, at 96.
28. RUSSELL, MEDICARE'S NEW HOSPITAL PAYMENT SYsTEM:

IS IT WORKING? 72

(1989); Russell & Manning, The Effect of Prospective Payment on Medicare
Expenditures, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 439 (1989). Medicare Part A pays for hospital
care and other institutional services; Part B pays for physician's services and related
care.

29. The term profit is used here in a generic sense to mean the excess of revenues

over costs, because most hospitals are technically non-profit institutions. Even nonprofit hospitals, however, often attempt to maximize their revenues and minimize
costs to free up funds for capital investment or to benefit their managerial or medical
staff. P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 437-38 (1982);

Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1416,
1436-37 (1980); Etzioni & Doty, Profit in Non-Profit Corporations: The Example of

Health Care, 91 POL. SCI. Q. 433 (1976).
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extraordinary amounts of resources on other hospitals."0
In addition to under-service, DRG-PPS reimbursement
creates incentives for perverse behaviors that could likewise
increase costs and threaten patients. For example, because
hospitals are paid under DRG-PPS on a per-admission basis,
they could cause a patient with multiple complaints to undergo
multiple admissions. Alternatively, the hospital could create
multiple admissions by transferring patients among hospitals
or distinct parts of hospitals (to nursing facility or rehabilitation wings, for example). Hospitals might also attempt to
"upcode"' patients to a more lucrative DRG, or to "unbundle"' 2 charges by, for example, requiring outpatient testing
s
before or after an admission, to increase reimbursement. 3
Since RB-RVS physician reimbursement still pays physicians on a per-service basis, the incentives it creates for good
and for ill are less dramatic than those of DRG-PPS. The costcontainment opportunities in RB-RVS are found more in the
control it gives the Medicare program over increases in the
prices it pays than in incentives it creates for individual professionals to render care more cost-effectively. Insofar as the RBRVS system contemplates increasing payment for cognitive
services and decreasing payments for technological services,
however, it creates incentives for early, preventive intervention, and decreases the incentives created by charge-based
reimbursement for excessive and costly technical interven30. For a discussion of predictions of such problems at the outset of DRG-PPS, see
W. ROE & J. GONG, THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ON THE
QUALITY OF CARE 29, 31-34, 37 (1986); Enthoven & Noll, ProspectivePayment Will it
Solve Medicare's FinancialProblems, ISSUES IN SCIENCE & TECH. 101, 107 (Fall 1984);
Guterman & Dobson, Impact of the Medicare Prospective Payment System on
Hospitals, 7 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 97, 108 (Spring 1986); Lave, Hospital
Reimbursement Under Medicare, 62 MILBANK MEM. FUND Q. 251, 261 (1984); Lewis,
Speculations on the Impact of Prospective Pricingand DRGs, 140 WESTERN J. MED.
638, 643 (1984).
31. Upcoding is identifying a rendered service as a more complex and costly
service for billing purposes to increase reimbursement, e.g., billing a simple
examination as a comprehensive examination.
32. Unbundling is billing a single service under more than one code as more than
one service.
33. See ROE & GONG, supra note 30, at 34-35; Enthoven & Noll, supra note 30, at

107-110; Lave, supra note 30, at 261-262; Lewis, supra note 30, at 642-643. Hospitals
may also attempt to engage in "cost-shifting," whereby they bill other payers for the
shortfall they experience from Medicare payments. Though this practice may result in
higher costs for other payers, and thus increase the cost of health care generally, it
does not increase the cost of Medicare generally. In fact, significant cost-shifting does
not seem to have occurred under DRG-PPS, as other payers have also limited their
payments to hospitals. See RUSSELL, supra note 28, at 77-78.
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tions. Moreover, the volume performance monitoring built
into the system may provide weak incentives for limiting
excessive provision of services.
RB-RVS physician payment may also create perverse
incentives, however. It might, for example, motivate upcoding
and unbundling as a means of increasing payment per-service
or the number of reimbursed services. If implementation of
volume performance standards in fact results in reduced perservice payment, individual physicians may face even greater
incentives to increase the volume of services they provide to
maintain their income.' Limitations imposed by OBRA 1989
on the ability of physicians to bill Medicare beneficiaries
beyond Medicare payment levels might also encourage physicians to increase the volume of their services.
Capitation payment to HMOs also generates both cost-containment opportunities and potential hazards. Capitation
should save money by reducing unnecessary services. 3 It
could also, however, result in under-service to HMO enrollees
or favoritism in the selection process-attempts to enroll only
healthy Medicare beneficiaries who will demand less than
average amounts of services.'
In sum, the structure of the payment method could stimu34. See Furrow, PhysicianPayment Reform" Plugging the Drain,ST. LOUIS U. L.
REv. (1990). The issues of whether, and to what extent, physicians are able to increase
the demand for their own services is hotly debated in the economics of health care
literature. Compare Feldman & Sloan, Competition Among PhysiciansRevisited, 13 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 239 (1988); Reinhardt, Economists in Health Care: Saviors or
Elephants in a Porcelain Shop?, 79 AEA PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 337 (1989). It is
clear, however, that during the Medicare physician fee freeze of the mid-1980s the
volume of physician services rose dramatically, driving a steady increase in Medicare
expenditures on physician care, and suggesting that physicians are capable of
increasing volume of services if necessary to protect their income. See Mitchell, Wedig,
& Cromwell, supra note 19. Recent studies demonstrating that physicians who own
laboratory or imaging equipment tend to order more tests or images also sustain this
hypothesis. See Hillman, et. al., Frequency and Costs of DiagnosticImaging in Off'ce
Practice- A Comparison of Sef-Referring and Radiologist-ReferringPhysicians,323
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1604; Iglehart, Congress Moves to Regulate Self-Referral and
Physician's Ownership of Clinical Laboratories, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1682 (1990)
[hereinafter Congress Moves].
35. The method by which risk-based Medicare HMOs are paid, which requires
them to pass on profits to beneficiaries, diminishes the strength of incentives to reduce
cost, however. In fact, Medicare HMOs do not seem to have saved money. Indeed,
Medicare beneficiaries in HMOs cost Medicare more than they would have cost in the
fee-for-service sector. Hadley, Evaluation of Medicare Competition Demonstrations,
11 HEALTH CARE FIN. REv. 65, 76 (Winter 1989).
36. See id. at 74-76; Parks & Waxman, The Medicare/HMO "Partnership",Some
Problemsfor Beneficiaries, 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 236 (1987).
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late either under- or over- provision of medical care. DRGPSS- and capitation-based payment would generally be predicted to encourage under-provision of services rendered any
particular patient during any particular hospital admission.
DRG-PPS could, however, result in both under- and over-provision of services, thereby encouraging excessive admissions
coupled with under-provision of services during any particular
admission. RB-RVS (and cost- or charge-based reimbursement,
which survives for various other services), on the other hand,
should generally encourage over-provision.
Both under- and over-provision of medical services could
harm patients. The patient discharged from a hospital prematurely, with, for example, an uncontrolled infection, may suffer further complications or die. The patient denied preventive
care may later require acute care. The patient who receives
too many services, on the other hand, is at increased risk for
iatrogenic injury, which is a possible result from many forms
of medical care. 7 Medicare's payment of more and more services, albeit a reduced per-unit cost, could cause over-provision
of services, resulting in increased costs.
V. CONTROLLING THE UNDESIRED EFFECTS OF COSTCONTAINMENT
Altering methods of payment for services to encourage
cost-control is likely to create incentives for under- or overprovision of services. Moreover, these incentives are undesirable because they could harm patients and increase costs.

Thus, assuming the accuracy of these assertions, what can be
done to offset the incentives?
Undoubtedly the most important and effective force counterbalancing financial incentives for over- or under-provision
of services is the commitment to the well being of patients that
characterizes the vast majority of health care professionals and

institutions in this country. The notion of allegiance to the
patient's best interests runs deep in the training and culture of
physicians and other health care professionals.' In all likelihood, it will be adequate in most cases to deter a professional

from ordering or providing services that are likely to be harm37. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, I MEDICARE: A STRATEGY FOR QuALITY ASSURANCE

211-216 (1990) [hereinafter IOM.
38. Jost, The Necessary and Proper Role of Regulation to Assure the Quality of
Health Care, 25 Hous. L. REV. 525, 536-539 (1988).
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ful and unlikely to be efficacious, or from failing to order services that are clearly necessary. This sense of obligation to the
patient, and a sense of civic responsibility, should also be sufficient in many cases to sway a doctor from providing unneeded,
but probably harmless, services or from withholding services
that would probably be beneficial.
An influential trend of quality assurance literature argues
for relying primarily on these instincts to ensure the quality of
medical care. The "continuous quality improvement school"
contends that most providers of health care services will be
willing to improve the quality of those services if the environment in which they practice encourages improvement.-9 They
argue against strategies of quality assurance that rely primarily
on identifying instances of wrongdoing and punishment of "bad
apples" as wasting resources and encouraging fear and
evasion. 4°
While much can be said generally favoring quality assurance strategies that rely primarily on encouraging and informing professionals, one can still question whether these
strategies are, in the final analysis, adequate for policing cost
containment. First, there are bad apples who because of ignorance, incompetence, or greed, harm their patients by providing too many or too few services. 4' Second, it is likely that
even the best doctors (and even more likely, the vast majority
of doctors who are neither the best nor the worst) yield from
time to time to the temptation to err on the side of providing
too many or too few services when it is in their financial interest to do so and where it is unlikely that the patient will be
affirmatively harmed by the decision.' The uncertainty that
attends much medical decision-making offers ample opportunity for such decisions.4 3
If we cannot rely exclusively on the good will and professionalism of health care providers to protect against over- or
under-provision of services, where can we turn for help? First,
39. IOM, supra note 37, at 58-61; Berwick, Continuous Improvement as an Ideal
in Health Care, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 53 (1989).

40. Berwick, supra note 39, at 53-54.
41. See IOM, supra note 37, at 211-216.
42. See Hillman, supra note 34; Congress Moves, supra note 34, demonstrating the
tendency of physicians to order more services where they are directly benefited by the
orders.
43. See discussion of medical uncertainty in the text accompanying notes 98-103,
i nfra.
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the threat of medical malpractice litigation undoubtedly serves
as a deterrent to under-provision of care. Arguments that the
potential of malpractice liability results in "defensive"
medicine-i.e., over-provision of unnecessary care--are quite
common." In fact, defensive medicine may well be encouraged
less by the threat of medical malpractice than by the reward of
cost- and charge-based reimbursement. Under-provision of
medical care can result in malpractice liability only if it can be
characterized as "negligent," i.e., sub-minimal, and if it results
in dramatic, measurable damages to the patient.
The vast majority of victims of medical negligence never
recover damages.' Moreover, the elderly, who receive most
Medicare-financed care, are far less likely to sue for medical
malpractice than the general population.4 Thus, under-payment systems that reward under-provision of care, practitioners and institutions may well opt for the direct financial
benefit of under-provision and discount the uncertain and distant threat of medical malpractice liability.
Administrative responses may also be possible as a means
of protecting against over- and under-provision of services. To
some extent payment systems can be structured to create
counter-balancing incentives-for example, to control the volume of, as well as the payment level for, services. The German
health insurance system places overall expenditure caps on
physician services so that increased volume results in
decreased per-service payments. 47 The RB-RVS system will do
the same thing through the volume performance standards;
but because imposition of these standards is ultimately discretionary with Congress, they may be less effective. However,
such overall limits have little impact on the individual service
provider, who still faces incentives to expand volume to
increase payment.
Another alternative is policing cost containment: to adopt
regulatory programs that attempt to detect and penalize over44. See, e.g., 1 AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80s 16
(1984).
45. HARvARD MED. PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS AND LAWYERS:
MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW
YORK 6 (1990).
46. P. DANZON, MED. MALPRACTICE 74 (1985).

47. See Kirkman-Liff, Physician Payment and Cost-Containment Strategies in
West Germany: Suggestions for Medicare Reform, 15 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 69
(1990).
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or under-provision of care, or in other words, to adopt an overall strategy of driving the herd of institutions and professionals
in the direction of cost containment through incentive programs and then picking off through regulation the strays who
go too far or too fast.
To police Medicare cost containment, Congress has created
several regulatory programs. First are the Medicare and Medicaid Fraud and Abuse laws. Enforced by the HHS Office of
Inspector General (OIG), the Department of Justice, and state
Medicaid fraud and abuse units, these laws punish a wide variety of perverse provider responses to payment systems-such
as payment dumping or hospital financial incentives to
encourage under-provision of care-through criminal and civil
penalties or exclusion from the Medicare program." Second,
the insurance companies that administer the Medicare program (denominated "intermediaries" for Part A and "carriers"
for Part B), may refuse payment for services that are not reasonable and necessary.4 9 The third regulatory program, the
Medicare Utilization and Quality Peer Review Organization
(PRO) program, is the focus of this essay.
48. Though Medicare fraud and abuse is criminal conduct, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b,
the fraud and abuse enforcement efforts of Health of Human Services also resemble a
regulatory program. Because a substantial proportion of fraud and abuse enforcement
is carried out through civil sanctions and program exclusions administered by the
Office of Inspector General (OIG) of HHS, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 -7(a), subject to
administrative and judicial review and because the OIG has power to bind the
enforcement of the criminal fraud and abuse laws through the promulgation of "safe
harbor" regulations, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b((3)(D), the fraud and abuse enforcement
efforts of HHS bear many of the characteristics of a regulatory program.
Descriptions of the operation of the Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse
programs can be found in Teplitzky & Holden, 1989 Developments in Medicare and
Medicaid Fraud and Abuse, in 1990 HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 433 (A. Gosfield, ed.
1990); and Teplitzky, Holden, Sollins, Medicare and Medicaid Fraud and Abuse, in
1989 HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK, 507 (A. Gosfield, ed. 1989). Further discussion of the
fraud and abuse laws and their effect on the health care industry can be found in
Frankford, Creating and Dividing the Fruits of Collective Economic Activity:
Referrals Among Health Care Providers, 89 COL. L. REV. 1861 (1989); Hall, Making
Sense of ReferralFee Statutes, 13 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 623 (1988); and Morreim,
Physician Investment and Sef-Referra" Philosophical Analysis of a Contentious
Debate, 15 J. MED. & PHIL. 425 (1990).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1); 42 C.F.R. § 405.310(k). Intermediary review focuses on
non-covered experimental care and on appropriate use of non-hospital institutional
settings, such as nursing homes and hospices. Carrier utilization review focuses on
specific service likely to be used unnecessarily. For descriptions of carrier and
intermediary utilization and quality review efforts, see GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
MEDICARE: IMPROVING QUALITY OF CARE ASSESSMENT AND ASSURANCE, (1988) 25-41;
Nyman, Feldman, Shapiro, Grogan & Link, Changing Physician Behavior. Does
Medical Review on PartB Medicare Claims Make a Difference?, 27 INQUIRY 127 (1990).
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While the Fraud and Abuse program primarily oversees
the financial and business practices of providers, and the medicare insurers police overutilization of particular procedures or
by particular providers, the PRO program is the primary medical watchdog of the Medicare program. It specifically examines medical care provided by institutions and professionals to
determine whether the care was necessary, appropriate, 50 and
provided in accordance with professional quality standards.5 '
Thus, the Fraud and Abuse program is Medicare's front-line
defense against over- or under-provision of medical care.
PROs are statewide, non-governmental, medical peerreview organizations, usually but not necessarily physiciansponsored. They contract with HHS to review the records of
Medicare cases, chosen both at random and by focused selection criteria, to identify utilization and quality problems.
The PRO program was instituted in 1982 as a successor to
the Professional Standards Review Organization (PSRO) program that had existed for the preceding decade. At its inception, the PRO program, like the PSRO program, was
concerned primarily with excessive utilization of medical care,
and utilization review continues to be an important mission of
the PROs. 2 However, the PSRO program, which monitored
cost-based hospital reimbursement, focused on hospital admissions and length of stay.5' With the arrival of DRG-PPS reimbursement, excessive length of stay ceased to be a problem.' 4
The PROs, therefore, refocused their utilization review efforts
to determining whether admissions were necessary, policing
readmissions and transfers, and reviewing the necessity and
appropriateness of specific procedures in particular settings
(e.g., should cataract surgery be done on an outpatient or inpatient basis?).
50. See proposed rules defining appropriateness and necessity for purposes of
approving Medicare coverage for technology, 54 Fed. Reg. 4302 (1989).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(1). See generally on the PRO program, IOM, supra note
37, at 160-200; Gosfield, PROs: A Case Study in Utilization Management and Quality
Assurance, 1989 HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 361; Jost, Administrative Law Issues
Involving The Medicare Utilization and Quality Control Peer Review Organization
(PRO) Program: Analysis and Recommendations, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1989).
52. Cotton, PROs Shift Toward Quality as HMO Review Nears, Medical World
News, Dec. 22, 1986, at 46.
53. For a discussion of PRO utilization review, see A. GOsFIELD, PSROs: THE LAW
AND THE HEALTH CONSUMER 38-42 (1975); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE
EFFECT OF PSROs ON HEALTH CARE COSTS: CURRENT FINDINGS AND FUTURE
EVALUATIONS 9-10 (1979).
54. K. LOHR, PEER REVIEW ORG.: QUALITY ASSURANCE IN MEDICARE 16-17 (1985).
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The primary utilization review instrument of the PROs is
retrospective review of patient records, first by a non-physician
reviewer, then, if problems are identified, by a physician. If
inappropriate or unnecessary services are identified, the PRO
can instruct the intermediary to deny payment. The PROs
also review and can deny prospectively requests for performance of certain procedures.'
In the late 1980s and into the 1990s, the PROs, while continuing their utilization review efforts, have become more concerned with deficiencies in the quality of medical care, in
particular with problems that stem from under service.
Indeed, the PROs now view quality control as their primary
mission.'
The PROs identify potential problems with the
quality of medical care through a variety of approaches, including the application of generic quality-screens and prematuredischarge criteria to the medical records of selected cases."
Most of the cases are selected from hospitals, although PROs
also review skilled nursing, home health, outpatient, HMO,
and, on a limited basis, ambulatory care.'
Once non-physician reviewers identify potential quality
infractions in medical records, these problems are further
reviewed by physician reviewers.5 9 If the physician reviewer
(and perhaps further specialist reviewers), after contact with
the physician whose care is questioned, agrees that the care
was substandard, the case enters the PRO's quality assurance
process. 0 PROs are also responsible for reviewing beneficiary
complaints about quality of care or beneficiary appeals when
providers deny further Medicare-covered care.6 1 Finally, PROs
continually assemble profile data on patients, physicians,
55. PRO Third Scope of Work, §§ VI, X. at 16-22, 26-27 [hereinafter Third Scope].
(The PRO Scope of Work sets the terms for the contract between the PROs and
DHHS. The Third Scope of Work covers the contracts currently in effect from 1988
through 1990).
56. HHS OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE UTILIZATION AND QuALITY
CONTROL PEER REVIEW OR. (PRO) PROGRAM: QUALITY REVIEW ACTIVITIES, 10-12
(1988) [hereinafter OIG].
57. Id. at 6-7; Third Scope, supra note 55, § V(B), at 6-7. Such screens and criteria,
for example, flag cases involving patients discharged with abnormal vital signs or who
contracted an infection, suffered a trauma, or unexpectedly returned to surgery while
in the hospital.
58. See IOM, supra note 37, at 178, 195-99.
59. Third Scope, supra note 55, § V(B), at 6-7; Jost, supra note 51, at 34-35.
60. Third Scope, supra note 55, § § V(D)-(G), at 7-15; Jost, supra note 51, at 36.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(14), (e). See also proposed rules for review of
beneficiary complaints, 42 Fed. Reg. 1956 (1989).
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DRGs, hospitals, diagnoses and procedures to identify quality
aberrations.
When quality problems are identified, the deficient physician or institution is usually placed under a corrective action
plan. This may involve continuing education, intensified monitoring, involvement of hospital committees, or other appropriate interventions to improve quality. 62 PROs undertook 11,786
quality interventions between the term of the implementation
of the contract under which the PROs are currently operating
4
(the Third Scope of Work)63 and June 30, 1990. If the corrective action plan is unsuccessful, or if the physician or institution otherwise demonstrates an inability or unwillingness to
resolve quality deficiencies, the PRO can refer the physician or
institution to the HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) for
sanctions.' The OIG can either impose a civil fine or exclude
the physician or provider from the Medicare program.'
The PRO must also report the noncompliant physician to
the state licensing board at the time it notifies the OIG (if it
has not already done so),67 and the OIG must publish notice of

HHS also has statutory
sanctions in local newspapers. 6
authority to simply refuse to pay for care that the PROs find
to be of substandard quality.69 This provision has not yet been
implemented.
The regulatory strategy that the PROs implement-review
of individual patient records and profiling of physicians and
institutions to police utilization and quality-is a logical
approach to policing the potential problems of Medicare payment incentive systems. It resembles the review systems used
in central European nations that rely on social insurance for
financing health care. In Germany, for example, physicians
are paid on a fee-for-service basis out of a fixed negotiated
62. Third Scope, supra note 55, § V(G), at 10-13; Jost, supra note 51, at 36.
63. For most of the PROs, the Third Scope of Work was implemented on April 1,
1989. For 13 of the PROs, however, it was implemented on October 1, 1988, and for
one, in December, 1989.
64. HHS, REsuLTs OF PEER REVIEW ORG. REVIEW FOR THE THIRD SCOPE OF WORK,
12 (1990) [hereinafter RESULTS].

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(b).
42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(b)(1) & (3).
Pub.L. 101-508, § 4205(d) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(9)).
42 C.F.R. 1004.100(d).
42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(1)(C), (3)(B), as amended by Pub.L. 101-508, § 4205(g).

See proposed Rules for implementing the substandard care payment denial provisions,

published at 54 Fed. Reg. 1056 (1989).
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overall budget.
The Kassendrztlichen Vereinignungen, or
organization of insurance doctors, then relies on utilization
profiling and sanctions to control doctors who abuse the system.70 But do the benefits of this form of regulation outweigh
its costs?
VI. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF POLICING COST
CONTAINMENT: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE
PRO PROGRAM

The PRO program currently costs about $300 million a
year.7 1 While this represents less than a third of a percent of
the Medicare budget, it is nonetheless a great deal of money.
Moreover, the time that institutions and professionals spend in
responding to PRO information demands for corrective action
is also costly.72 It is, therefore, appropriate to ask if the program is worth its cost.
One indicator of PRO performance might be volume of
activity. From the implementation of the Third Scope of Work
through June 30, 1990 PROs retrospectively reviewed 2,489,633
hospital cases.7 3 They denied payment on only 47,708 (1.92 percent) of these.7 4 During the same period, PROs reviewed
176,364 ambulatory surgery cases, denying payment on 1,034
(0.59 percent) of them; and reviewed prospectively 2,995,573
proposed procedures, denying payment on only 4,531 (0.15 percent) of them.75 Ten PROs denied fewer than 10 cases on
preprocedure review during that time period, 16 PROs denied
0.5 percent or fewer of the preprocedure cases reviewed.7" Of
course, because the PROs review only about one quarter of all
70. See D. STONE, THE LIMITS OF PROFESSIONAL POWER: NATIONAL HEALTH CARE
IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1980); M. Dohler, Regulating the Medical
Profession in Germany:
manuscript).

The Politics of Efficiency Review (1987)

(unpublished

71. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MEDICARE'S PEER REVIEW ORG. 21-23

(1990).
72. See, e.g. Beverly Hosp. v. Bowen, 872 F.2d 483 (D.C.Cir. 1989); Burlington
Memorial Hosp. v. Bowen, 644 F.Supp. 1020 (W.D.Wis. 1986) (requiring HHS to
consider the costs that hospitals incur in copying medical records for PRO review.);

Baldwin & Fackelmann, Blizzard of Paperwork, New Rules are Burying PROs and
Hospitals,MODERN HEALTHCARE, Jan. 3, 1986, at 46.
73. RESULTS, supra note 64, at 4.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2, 6.
76. Id. at 1-2.
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Medicare hospital admissions,7 7 and a much smaller percentage
of Medicare-financed care in other venues, the percentage of
total Medicare cases for which payment was denied by PROs is
even smaller than these numbers indicate.78
When the volume of PRO quality intervention is considered, PRO achievements are equally meager. From the
2,489,633 quality reviews completed during the Third Scope of
Work through June 30, 1990, PROs identified 31,008 minor
quality problems, 12,671 more serious problems, and 1,879 very
serious quality problems.7 9 Thus, PROs identified quality
problems in 1.83 percent of the cases then reviewed, serious
quality problems in only 0.08 percent of the cases.' ° Eleven
thousand seven hundred and eighty-six confirmed problems
resulted in quality interventions involving 2,782 physicians and
725 hospitals.8 ' During fiscal year 1990, the PROs recommended 29 sanctions to the OIG, resulting in 13 exclusions
from the Medicare program. 2
While on its face this work product seems insignificant, it
is, of course, impossible to determine PRO effectiveness from
these data unless the extent of inappropriate, unnecessary, and
substandard care is known. Unfortunately, the full extent of
questionable medical care is not known. Indeed, given the
complexity of the issues involved, accurate data may never
become available. Such data as exist, however, indicate that
PROs fall far short of identifying all instances of over service
77. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE: IMPROVING QUALITY OF CARE
ASSESSMENT AND ASSURANCE 45 (1988) (hereinafter GAO, QUALITY].

78. HHS itself is reportedly considering whether the PRO program has proved
cost-effective. HHS has announced that it is considering eliminating preprocedure
review and review of readmissions, and cutting PRO budgets by 10-25 percent for the
Fourth Scope of Work, beginning later in 1991. HHS's proposed decision is based
largely on the disappointing statistical performance of the PROs. HCFA Wants to Kill
Preprocedure Review, Cut PRO Budgets 10-25 Percent, 18 MED. UTILIZATION REV. 1-2
1990.
79. REsULTS, supra note 64, at 8. Under the Third Scope of Work, the PROs are to
assign one of three severity levels to identified quality problems. Level III problems
involve medical mismanagement with significant adverse effects on the patient, level II
problems involve medical mismanagement with potential for adverse effects, and level
I problems involve medical mismanagement without potential for significant adverse
effects on the patient; Third Scope, supra note 55, § V(D), at 7.
80. RESULTS, supra note 64, at 8.
81. Id. at 12.
82. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICE,
REPORT ON SANCTION RECOMMENDATIONS FROM PEER REVIEW ORG. FOR SEPTEMBER
1990 [hereinafter OIG REPORT].
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A Rand corporation study involving expert panel review of
5,000 hospital patient records determined that 17 percent of
upper-gastrointestinal endoscopies were inappropriate and 11
percent not clearly appropriate; 17 percent of coronary angiographies inappropriate and 9 percent not clearly appropriate." A subsequent GAO study found 20 percent of coronary
angiographies inappropriate and 10 percent not clearly appropriate. 5 A study of carotid endarterectomies indicated that 32
percent were inappropriate and 32 percent not clearly appropriate.8 6 Other studies estimate that 14 percent of coronary
artery bypass surgeries and 20 percent of cardiac pacemaker
implantation are inappropriate.8 7 Overuse of more common
diagnostic and x-ray procedures is also suspected, as evidenced
by significantly greater use of radiography by physicians who
own their own x-ray equipment when compared to those who
must refer patients out for x-rays.8"
Evidence also exists of excessive hospitalization of the elderly. A study conducted by the HHS OIG of 7,050 Medicare
patients in 1984 and 1985 concluded that 10.5 percent of hospital admissions were unnecessary. 89 The recent Rand Corporation PPS quality study concluded that 23 percent of the 1,168
patients with five diseases whom it reviewed had too long a
hospital stay. 90 Last year's Institute of Medicine study of the
quality of Medicare-financed care interviewed physicians in
focus groups. They estimated that 10 to 30 percent of services
provided by the health care system were unnecessary. 91 Per83. On evidence of overuse, see generally IOM, supra note 37, at 221-223.
84. Chassin, Kosecoff, Park, Winslow, Kahn, Merrick, Keesey, Fink, Solomen, &
Brook, Does Inappropriate Use Explain Geographic Variations in the Use of Health
Care Services? A Study of Three Procedures,258 J. A.M.A. 2533 (1987).
85. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN THE
IDENTIFICATION OF INAPPROPRIATE Hosp. CARE, 41 (1989) [hereinafter GAO,
Inappropriate].
86. Winslow, The Appropriatenessof Carotid Endarterectomy, 318 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 721 (1988).
87. Winslow, Kosecoff, Chassin, Kanouse & Brook, The Appropriateness of
Performing Coronary Artery Bypass Surgery, 260 J. A.M.A. 505 (1988); Greenspan,
Incidence of UnwarrantedImplantationof Permanent CardiacPacemakersin a Large
Medical Population,318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 158 (1988).
88. Hillman, supra note 34.
89. HHS OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, NATIONAL DRG VALIDATION STUDY:
UNNECESSARY ADMISSIONS TO HOSPITALS, 4 (1988).
90. Rubenstein, Changes in Quality of Care for Five Diseases Measured by
Implicit Review 1981 to 1986, 264 J. A.M.A. 1974, 1978 (1990).
91. IOM, supra note 37, at 224.
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haps most damning are the findings of Systemetrics, Inc., the
so-called SuperPRO, which contracts with HHS to review PRO
performance. Replicating PRO retrospective admission review
in 53,942 cases, the SuperPRO denied 12.1 percent of the
admissions, over 4.6 times the rate of PRO denials for the same
cases.

92

With respect to quality of care, the recent Harvard Medical Practice study, which reviewed 30,121 medical records from
hospitalizations in New York in 1984, found adverse events in
3.7 percent of the cases, of which 27.6 percent, or 1 percent of
the total, were attributable to negligence.9 3 The Rand Corporation study of quality of care under PPS concluded that 12
percent of the 1,366 patients it studied from 1985-1986 received
poor or very poor care.P4 A study published in 1988 concluded
that 14 percent of 182 deaths reviewed were preventable.9 5 An
OIG study of 7,050 Medicare patient records found that 6.6 percent of the patients received poor quality care. 6 Physicianowned liability companies terminated .66 percent of their
insured physicians in 1985 because of "negligence-prone behavior" and limited the scope of covered practice or otherwise
T
sanctioned another 2.5 percentY
This evidence suggests that PROs fail to capture the vast
majority of instances of unnecessary care, and probably miss a
significant, if less substantial, number of quality deficiencies.
Does that mean that the PRO program is not worth its cost?
This is an inappropriate conclusion, however, until the apparently meager volume of PRO activity addressing utilization
and quality problems is explained.

VII. BARRIERS TO PRO ACTIVITY
A.

Lack of ProfessionalConsensus

One reason for the low volume of PRO review of utiliza92. GAO, INAPPROPRIATE, supra note 85, at 46.
93. HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS:
MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW

YORK 3 (1990).
94. Rubenstein, supra note 90, at 1978.
95. Dubois & Brook, Preventable Deaths: Who, How Often, and Why?

109

ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 582 (1988).
96. OIG, NATIONAL DRG VALIDATION STUDY, QUALITY OF PATIENT CARE IN
HOSPITALS 4 (1989).

97. Schwartz & Mendleson, The Role of Physician-Owned Insurance Companies
in the Detection and Deterrence of Negligence, 262 J. A.M.A. 1342, 1344 (1989).
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tion and quality problems is the absence of a professional consensus on what is "appropriate" medical care for many
conditions. This lack of consensus is amply illustrated by literature showing that the use of certain medical procedures varies
dramatically even within small geographic areas. Thus, the
well-known research of Professor John Wennberg has found
that in a single state (Maine) the likelihood that a woman 70
years old would have had a hysterectomy varies from 20 percent to 70 percent among different hospital markets, and the
probability that a man aged 85 would have undergone a prostatectomy varies from 15 to 60 percent.98 Another study of Medicare beneficiaries found that the number of total kneereplacement surgeries ranged from 3 to 20 per-10,000 beneficiaries, and the number of hip arthroplasties (not total hip)
ranged from 2 to 18 per-10,000. 9 While there is substantially
greater consensus as to the appropriate treatment for other
conditions, the overall level of uncertainty as to appropriate
diagnosis and treatment of many medical conditions is much
higher than is commonly appreciated. 1'0
The PROs themselves further evidence the lack of professional consensus on appropriate utilization of medical care.
PROs vary dramatically among themselves with respect to the
number of cases that they determine to fail identical quality
screens and the percentage of screen failures that are eventually confirmed as representing quality problems. 01 ' Out of 4053
cases evaluated by both PRO and SuperPRO physicians for
appropriateness, the physicians of the'two entities agreed only
56.9 percent of the time.'0 2 During the most recent reporting
period, 42.95 percent of PRO payment denials for which reconsiderations were requested were reversed or modified on
03

reconsideration.1

Given this lack of consensus, it is understandable that
PROs err on the side of finding that care is necessary, appropriate, and of acceptable quality by generating low numbers of
98. Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice Variations: A Proposalfor Action,
3 HEALTH AFFAIRS 6, 9 (Summer 1984).

99. Chassin, Variations in the Use of Medical and Surgical Services by the
Medicare Population,314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 285, 287 (1986).
100. Eddy, Variations in Physician Practice: The Role of Uncertainty, 3 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 74 (1984).

101. OIG, supra note 56, at 14.
102. GAO, INAPPROPRIATE, supra note 85, at 48.
103. RESULTS, supra note 64, at 10.
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payment denials and quality reviews. Several other factors
support this tendency.
B.

PROs as Self-Regulating

First, PROs embody professional self-regulation, at least to
some degree. The PRO statute gives preference for obtaining
PRO contracts to "physician-sponsored organizations," i.e.,
entities that are composed of a substantial number of licensed
physicians in the area served by the PRO and that are representative of practicing physicians in the area.' °4 The Health
Care Financing Administration defines a physician-sponsored
organization as one composed of 20 percent of the physicians in
the area or, if composed of between 10 percent and 20 percent
of the physicians, possessing letters of physician and physician
organizations demonstrating that it is representative of area
physicians. 10 5 As of 1986, 44 of the 54 PROs were physiciansponsored organizations." °
One would expect physician-sponsored PROs to be
unlikely to engage in robust review that might offend their
constituents. 10 7 Professionals engaging in self-regulation
always face the temptation to be too understanding, to be more
sympathetic to a specific colleague who has committed an
understandable, though perhaps serious, error, than to the
faceless public who may be harmed by that error.0l'
Having acknowledged the self-regulatory nature of PROs,
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-2(b).
105. 42 C.F.R. 462.102.
106. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE: PHYSICIAN-SPONSORED
ORGANIZATIONS RECEIVE PRIORITY FOR PEER REVIEW CONTRACTS 3 (1988).
107. See discussing problems of professional self-regulation, J. BERLANT,
PROFESSION AND MONOPOLY: A STUDY OF MEDICINE IN THE UNITED STATES AND
GREAT BRITAIN 75-77 (1975); E. RAYACK, PROFESSIONAL POWER AND AMERICAN
MEDICINE: THE ECONOMICS OF THE AMERICAN MED. ASS'N 5-6 (1967); Derbyshire, How

Effective is Medical Self-Regulation?, 7 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 193 (1983); Dolan &
Urban, The Determinants of Effectiveness of Medical DisciplinaryBoards: 1960-1977,
7 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 203 (1983).
108. A recent GAO study of Medicare utilization review noted that PRO
physicians tended to have a "non-confrontational, collegial style" in approaching their
colleagues. "They often have extensive interactions with the attending physicians to
discuss particular cases and to discover if there is any additional information that
might justify the admission in question." The GAO study it noted further that PRO
reviewers "are themselves part of [the] professional community and must maintain
their standing within it." Interaction with attending physicians whose services are
questioned, therefore, might "facilitate the creation of a rationale for not denying
payment even though the admission remains truly questionable." GAO,
INAPPROPRIATE, supra note 85, at 33, 52.
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it is important not to make too much of it. Ten of the PROs
are not physician-sponsored organizations, but rather "physician-access" organizations," ° insurance companies or utilization review firms that hire physicians to conduct reviews.
Moreover, physician-sponsored organizations always face the
possibility of being replaced by physician-access organizations
during the next three-year contract cycle if they do not fulfill
their contract obligations. The American health care industry
is sufficiently complex and diverse that subcultures of professionals can, and have, developed more beholden to the public
than to organized medicine. The all-out wars that have developed between some of the PROs and their corresponding state
medical societies argue against a simplistic view of the PROs as
mere self-regulation. 110
C. PROs' Corrective Emphasis
The PROs' apparent lack of aggressiveness in pursuing
regulatory interventions may also reflect the corrective purpose of the PRO program. Generally, regulatory intervention
is directed toward one or more of several goals: (1) education
and redirection of one who has made a mistake to achieve correction, (2) punishment of a wrongdoer, (3) deterrence of
future errors on the part of the sanctioned party or of others
who may be tempted to error, or (4) incapacitation of a potential source of harm. To illustrate, the goals of sanctions initiated under the Medicare fraud and abuse laws are deterrence
and punishment. Thus the OIG can sanction a physician whose
billing clerk files false claims--even though the physician
claims absolute ignorance of the problem"'-thereby encouraging physicians to keep close watch over their billing clerks.
By contrast, the primary purpose of the PRO quality
assurance program, and its ancillary sanctions, is correction: A
physician may be sanctioned only if the PRO can demonstrate
109. See 42 C.F.R. § 462.103.
110. See, e.g., Schorr, Peer Review: Still Tilting at Windmills, 27 PHYsicIAN's
MGMT. 124 (October 1987); PROs Draw Fire from AMA House, Medical World News,
Jan. 12, 1987, at 24. The OIG, which ultimately imposes sanctions recommended by the
PROs, is even more independent than the PROs from professional self-regulation.
The office employs far more lawyers than doctors, and under the leadership of Richard
Kusserow has developed a sharply confrontational relationship with the AMA. See
AMA Again Flays HHS IG Kusserow, 18 MED. UTILIZATION REV. 1 (Dec. 6, 1990).
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(l); Inspector Gen. v. Silver, D.G.A.B. No. C-19,
Decision of Under Secretary (Mar. 8, 1988) (discussed in Teplitzky, Holden & Sollins,
supra note 48, at 513-14).
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that the physician lacks ability or willingness to comply with
professional standards of care." 2 Incapacitation and deterrence are secondary goals; punishment is of little importance.
Because the goal of the PRO quality assurance program is
correction, sanctions can be brought only after all efforts at
correction have failed. Only after a physician or institution has
clearly demonstrated that it lacks the capacity or will to
reform itself-usually after a lengthy attempt at correctioncan the PRO impose sanctions. Thus sanctions are the rare
exception rather than the rule. PROs do not sanction the vast
majority of poor quality care. Moreover, to the extent that the
PROs respond to identified quality problems by corrective
action, information concerning the action is usually by law
held strictly confidential." 3
Similarly, utilization review efforts are aimed primarily at
correction and incapacitation." 4 Only payment for particular
services is denied. Thus the physician who has rendered an
unnecessary service is not deterred from billing for it. The bill
may be paid; at worst payment will be denied; no other consequences will follow.
Two consequences flow from the PROs' heavy emphasis
on correction. First, the public and the industry may perceive
the PROs as far less active than they actually are. Corrective
action plans and utilization review denials go forward quietly,
usually shrouded by absolute confidentiality. They have, presumably, little effect beyond those directly'involved in them.
Second, correction-based regulatory systems such as the PROs
are exceedingly resource-intensive, particularly in comparison
to a deterrence-oriented system. One major Medicare fraud
case resulting in criminal or high-dollar civil penalties will
widely publicize the fact that certain conduct is very risky
(especially when aided by the explosion of continuing education programs and newsletters disseminating information
about the Medicare and Medicaid fraud laws). PROs, on the
other hand, have to proceed physician by physician and institution by institution when addressing problems of excessive utilization or poor quality.
112. 42 U.S.C. 1320c-5(a); see Jost, supra note 51, at 43-44.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-9; see Jost, supra note 51, at 69-70 (discussing restrictions on
sharing information regarding physician correction plans with hospitals).
114. Incapacitation here means denying the institution or the professional the
ability to receive funding from Medicare for a particular service.
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ProceduralInertia

Perhaps the most significant limitation on PRO activism in
utilization and quality regulation is "procedural inertia." A
regulatory agency such as the PRO may not simply refuse payment for a medically unnecessary or inappropriate service, or
terminate the participation of a professional or institution that
provides poor quality care by peremptory edict. Various procedures are available for challenging PRO payment denials and
participation terminations. Under procedural protections
established by the PRO statute and regulations, a physician or
hospital denied payment for a service by a PRO may request
reconsideration by the PRO." 5 If the denied payment is sufficiently large, the beneficiary who received the care may appeal
to an Administrative Law Judge, and may seek judicial review
once administrative remedies are exhausted." 16 A physician
sanctioned for providing substandard care by the OIG on the
recommendation of a PRO has the right to review by an
administrative law judge, the HHS appeals council, and, ultimately, the courts." 7 Rural physicians who are sanctioned
may additionally have the right to pre-sanction review."'
The aggregate effect of these procedural requirements is
to create considerable inertia, by limiting a PRO's ability to
impose swift and effective utilization denials or quality sanctions. A PRO that denies payment for a service, asserting the
service to be unnecessary or inappropriate, must be confident
that its decision is sufficiently supported by the consensus of
opinion in the medical community and that the decision either
will be accepted without appeal or will be upheld on appeal.
The PRO must be capable of marshalling evidence sufficient to
sustain the decision should it be reviewed. The decision must
be defensible. Given the variance in medical opinion as to the
appropriateness of many diagnoses and the necessity of many
procedures, however, defensible certainty in utilization review
115. 42 U.S.C. 1320c-4; 42 C.F.R. 473.15,.16.20; For descriptions of the utilization
review appeal process, see Gosfield, supra note 51, at 379-80; Jost, supra note 51, at 6468; Manning & Miller, Strategiesfor Appeals of PRO Payment Denials, 4 MED. STAFF
COUNSELOR 21 (Fall, 1990).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4, 42 C.F.R. 473.40 and .46. The amount in controversy must
be $200 for an appeal and $2,000 for judicial review.
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5, 42 C.F.R. 1004.1, Gosfield, supra note 51, at 380-383;
Jost, supra note 51, at 30-53.

118. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(b)(5). Pre-sanction review for rural physicians is available
only if the judge does not determine that the provider or practitioner will pose a

serious risk to Medicare beneficiaries.
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is hard to come by, and thus the program tends to err on the
side of too little, rather than too much, intervention.
With respect to quality issues, defensible certainty of PRO
decisions is even more important. The doctor facing Medicare
exclusion has a career on the line, and, if well advised, will
seek the best legal advocacy affordable. The PRO must first
convince the OIG (which has rejected 20 of the 45 PRO referrals it has received in the last two years) 119 that sanction is
appropriate. Based on the material provided by the PRO, the
OIG must then defend a normally spirited challenge to the
sanction recommendation brought by the physician's lawyer at
multiple levels of administrative and judicial review.12 Sanction cases consume considerable resources, for which the PRO
is not wholly compensated. A sanction recommendation that is
not ultimately upheld can also cost the PRO dearly in terms of
its credibility and support in the physician community. Absent
conviction that a sanction is absolutely necessary, the PRO is
unlikely to take on this expenditure of resources.
Procedural due process is, of course, important. The existence of procedures to review governmental actions serves
important values: avoiding error, protecting the innocent, and
preserving accountability and respect of the governed for the
institutions of government. But the existence of procedural
due process is also the source of great inertia; it erects barriers
1
to action that are often difficult for the PROs to surmount. 21
VIII.

PRO EFFECTIVENESS REVISITED

Do the accomplishments of the PRO program justify its
cost? Here we encounter a paradox. Despite the fact that the
output of the PRO program, as described above, seems almost
trivial, the goals of the PRO program are apparently being
accomplished.
For example, it was feared that with the introduction of
DRG PPS reimbursement, which paid hospitals on a peradmission basis, hospitals would increase admissions in order
to increase their revenue. 22 A primary goal of the PRO pro119. OIG REPORT, supra note 82.
120. For an account of a case in which the sanctioned doctor alleged, successfully,
that his defense was not sufficiently spirited, see Jury Awards Medicare-Sanctioned
Doctor $6.4 Million in Legal Malpractice Case, 18 MED. UTILIZATION REV. 1 (1990).
121. See Vladeck, Quality Assurance Through External Controls, 25 INQUIRY 100,
102 (1988) (noting the influence of due process requirements on quality assurance).
122. RUSSELL, supra note 28, at 25; and Lave, supra note 12, at 513. Of course,
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gram in the early years of PPS, therefore, was to monitor and
disallow inappropriate hospital admissions.123 In fact, hospital
admissions, which had been increasing steadily in the years
preceding the introduction of PPS, declined annually from
Much of the
1983 to 1987, only then beginning to rise slowly.'
care from
of
patient
to
the
movement
decline was attributable
inpatient to outpatient settings, the primary goal of much of
PRO "appropriateness" review.
It was also feared that per-admission DRG payment would
cause hospitals to discharge patients "quicker and sicker,"
The
increasing post-discharge complications and mortality.'
recently-released Rand study of the effects of PPS on the quality of medical care found some increase in the proportion of
patients discharged from hospitals in an unstable condition
(from 15 percent prior to PPS to 18 percent afterwards for five
diseases studied).12 Nevertheless, the study also established
that 30-day mortality (adjusted for sickness at admission) has
actually dropped since the introduction of PPS, while 180 day
In-hospital
mortality has remained essentially unchanged."
mortality has also declined.2 s The Rand study also discovered
that the quality of care in hospitals, measured by process criteria, has improved significantly since the introduction of PPS,
despite concern that resource constraints brought on by PPS
hospitals do not initiate admissions; physicians do.

Thus, a hospital alone cannot

increase its admissions. By pressuring or encouraging physicians to admit more
patients, however, or by advertising to increase patient demand, hospitals can to some
extent increase their patient volume.

123. K. LOHR, supra note 54, at 16-17, 22-29 (1985).
124. ProPAC, supra note 26, at 65-66.
125. RUSSELL, supra note 28, at 47.

126. Kosecoff, Kahn, Rogers, Reinisch, Sherwood, Rubenstein, Draper, Roth,
Chew & Brook, Prospective Payment System and Impairment at Discharge, 264 J.
A.M.A. 1980, 1982 (1990).
127. Kahn, Keeler, Sherwood, Rogers, Draper, Bentow, Reinisch, Rubenstein,
Kosecoff & Brook, Comparing Outcomes of Care Before and After Implementation of
the DR,-Based Prospective Payment System, 264 J. A.M.A. 1984, 1985 (1990).
Multitudinous contemporaneous developments, such as technological advances, make
it difficult to assess independently the ultimate impact of DRG-PPS on the quality of
care. Nevertheless, it is clear from the Rand study that quality has not seriously
deteriorated since that introduction of DRG-PPS. It should be noted, though, that the
Rand data came from the early years of DRG-PPS, when hospital reimbursement was
quite generous. Further belt-tightening in the very recent past may have a greater
negative impact on quality. See Lave, supra note 12, at 521-24; Oday & Dobson, Paying
Hospitals Under Medicare'sProspectivePayment System" Another Perspective, 7 YALE
J. REG. 529 (1990).

128. Kahn, Comparing Outcomes, supra note 127, at 1985.
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would reduce the quality of patient care. 12
Many factors no doubt contribute to these developments.
The role of the PROs should not, however, be discounted.
Although PRO denials of payment for unnecessary or inappropriate care and quality sanctions are relatively rare, the possibility of such disallowances and sanctions may have a
substantial sentinel effect.
Paradoxically, this effect may be magnified by the procedures that govern review of PRO utilization determinations.
The inertia that results from the procedural requirements with
which the PROs must comply before taking action has already
been noted as a possible explanation for apparent inaction of
the PROs. Procedural barriers that institutions and professionals face in responding to PRO actions may, on the other
hand, significantly enhance the effect of actions PROs do take.
To understand this paradox, consider again the procedures
attending PRO utilization review denials, discussed earlier. A
provider denied payment may ask the PRO to reconsider its
decision. If the PRO affirms its decision, however, the provider has no further recourse. No direct appeal is permitted to
providers; 30 but the provider may seek payment through
"waiver of liability" proceedings. In such proceedings, the provider or beneficiary claims that even though the service provided was unnecessary or inappropriate, Medicare should
nonetheless pay, because the provider did not know, and could
129. See Kahn, Measuring Quality of Care with Explicit Process Criteria Before
and After Implementation of the DRG-Based Prospective Payment System, 264 J.
A.M.A. 1969 (1990); Rubenstein, supra note 90. Most other studies have also found
that the quality of health care for Medicare beneficiaries has not deteriorated under
DRG-PPS, see RUSSELL, supra note 28, at 47-60; Lave, supra note 12, at 519 (1990). But
see Fitzgerald, Moore & Dittus, The Care of Elderly Patients with Hip Fractures,219
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1392 (1988) (suggesting that hip fracture patients were being
discharged earlier under DRG-PPS, with deleterious effects). Also, as PPS continues
to pay hospitals less and less relative to their costs, adverse quality effects that were
not apparent during the early, relatively generous, years of PPS, may begin to appear.
See Lave, supra note 12, at 521-24.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4, 42 C.F.R. 473.40, 46. If the amount in controversy exceeds
$200, the beneficiary for whom the service was denied may appeal the adverse decision
to an administrative law judge. If more than $2,000 is involved, the beneficiary may
seek judicial review. Though providers and practitioners can represent beneficiaries in
other Medicare appeals (if they do so without charge and having waived rights to
payment from the beneficiary), and thus effectively have the right to appeal, this right
is not available for PRO appeals. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(1)(D), Jost, supra note 51,
at 66-67. Thus the fact that beneficiaries do have appeal rights does not by any means
guaranty a provider denied payment a route for directly appealing the denial.
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not reasonably have known, that Medicare would not pay. 3 '
For example, Medicare may refuse to pay for a particular therapeutic modality ordered to treat a beneficiary's chronic condition, determining it to not be medically necessary, but may
waive liability, and therefore reimburse treatments received
before a necessity determination was made if it concludes that
the beneficiary and provider both reasonably believed that the
treatment was necessary. Providers may appeal and obtain
judicial review of adverse "waiver of liability" determinations. 1 32 A beneficiary making a waiver of liability claim will
usually prevail. A provider, however, will have a more difficult time establishing its ignorance of Medicare standards of
appropriateness or necessity because of its much greater experience with Medicare reimbursement. A provider who fails to
win a reconsideration of an adverse PRO decision on the merits or to establish the right to waiver of liability is thus unable
to collect either from Medicare or from the patient,
and must
33
itself absorb the cost of the unnecessary care.1
PRO and Medicare procedures create obvious incentives
for providers to ration care directly. Patient demand may play
some role in how often forms of treatment as to which there is
considerable variation in use among physicians are ordered.
Hip replacements or cataract surgery, for example, may be
procedures often requested by patients. Providers, however,
aware of the difficulties they may face in getting paid for particular procedures, may attempt to manipulate demand. First,
where a procedure is not requested, they may simply omit
mentioning it as a possibility. 13' Second, if the patient requests
the procedure or admission, the provider may inform the
patient that Medicare will not pay for it. A study of the PRO
preadmission review process conducted by Project Hope in
1987 found that 31 of the 34 hospitals surveyed had established
131. 42 U.S.C. § 1395pp(a)(2), 42 C.F.R. § 411.406.
132. If the amount in controversy exceeds $100 for Part A and $500 for Part B
determinations

the provider may appeal an adverse decision.

Judicial review is

available for adverse decisions involving more than $1,000. 42 U.S.C. 1395pp(d),
incorporating 42 U.S.C.ff(b)(2).
133. See 42 C.F.R. § 411.402 permitting Medicare to indemnify a beneficiary who
unwittingly received and paid for unnecessary care, and then to collect the amount as
an overpayment from the provider, who knew or should have known the care to be
unnecessary.
134. See Hultin & Hultin, An Advance in Medicare Advocacy: Protecting Patients

from Arbitrary Payment Coverage Denials, 3 MED. STAFF COUNS. 45, 46-47 (1989);
MEDICARE PROCEDURES SYMPOSIUM, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 23 (1987)
(remarks of Sally Hart Wilson).
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their own preadmission review processes.1 35 These hospital
preadmission review procedures resulted either in a formal
notice to the patient that the admission would probably not be
covered by Medicare, and thus was the patient's responsibility
under waiver of liability, or in informal attempts to discourage
the admission. The primary reason given by the hospitals for
instituting their own preadmission review process was to avoid
retrospective PRO denials."3
The Supreme Court in Blum v. Yaretsky 37 denied the
right to due process review to patients denied care under utilization review decisions of institutions, even though the decisions may have ramifications for the payment of public
benefits. Thus the patient may have no means of reviewing
this provider decision. Though the PRO program provides
review under some circumstances for provider decisions that
care is no longer necessary,"3 this review is focused primarily
on hospital discharge decisions. Indeed, to the extent that
providers simply omit mention of possible services that they do
not believe the PROs will approve, patients will be denied the
possibility of review of providers' decisions. Patients denied
care through provider rationing will, in most instances, there1 39
fore, have no recourse.
Where prospective PRO approval must be sought for an
admission or procedure, moreover, providers may fail to seek
approval of even procedures that are likely to be approved to
avoid the inevitable hassle that utilization review entails. The
much-publicized case of Wickline v. California"4 illustrates
this phenomenon. In that case Mrs. Wickline was hospitalized
for vascular problems. The California Medicaid program,
which financed her care, required length of stay utilization
review. When her condition had not stabilized by her initially
135. Project Hope, A Study of the Preadmission Review Process, 4-34 (1987)
(unpublished manuscript).
136. Id. at 4-35.
137. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
138. 42 U.S.C. 1320c-3(e); Third Scope, § 32-33.
139. But see the settlement in Sarrasat v. Sullivan, No. C 88-20161 (N.D. Cal.)
(May 17, 1989), Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH), 38,504 (requiring the Health Care
Financing Administration to compel nursing homes that determine beneficiaries to be
ineligible for Medicare-financed care to notify the beneficiary of this determination,
and, if the beneficiary requests, to file a claim with Medicare, which would result in an
appealable denial).
140. 192 Cal. App.3d 1630, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), petition for
review dismissed, 239 Cal. Rptr 805, 741 P.2d 613 (1987).
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scheduled discharge date, her physicians requested approval of
an additional eight days of hospitalization. The Medi-Cal utilization program approved only four days. At the end of the
four-day period Mrs. Wickline was discharged. No additional
extension was sought. Her treating physician, Dr. Polansky,
testified:
...that at the time in issue he felt that Medi-Cal Consultants had the State's interest more in mind than the
patient's welfare and that that belief influenced his decision
not to request a second extension of Wickline's hospital stay.
In addition, he felt that Medi-Cal had the power to tell him,
as a treating doctor, when a patient must be discharged from
the hospital. Therefore, while still of the subjective, noncommunicated, opinion that Wickline was seriously ill and
that the danger to her was not over Dr. Polansky discharged
141
her.. .[at the end of the four day extension period.]
Mrs. Wickline's condition deteriorated after her discharge,
necessitating a readmission and eventual amputation of her
right leg. When she sued Medi-Cal however, the court refused
to find the program liable, faulting her treating physicians for
not more aggressively pursuing a further extension of her hospitalization if they felt it was necessary. While the court
acknowledged that Dr. Polansky was "intimidated by the
Medi-Cal program,"'" it also noted that he was not "paralyzed" by Medi-Cal's response or "rendered powerless to act
appropriately if other action was required under the
circumstances.

143

While the court is, of course, right in the abstract, one can
understand the reluctance of the Dr. Polanskys of the world to
engage in the tedious (and often unremunerated) task of filling
out paperwork for approval of utilization requests and to face
the annoyance and humiliation that denial of the request may
entail when the proposed procedure or admission is a close
call. 44 One cannot but wonder what would happen on our
highways if we had no speed limits, but every time one wanted
to exceed 55 miles per-hour one had to submit a lengthy form
in triplicate and await a response. It is reasonable to suspect
141. Id. at 1640, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
142. Id. at 1645, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 671.

143. Id.
144. See GAO, INAPPROPRIATE, supra note 85, at 57 (noting the deterrent effect of
preprocedure certification requirements in private utilization review programs).
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that the number of cases in which PROs deny payment for
care on a preadmission or preprocedure basis does not begin to
represent the number of cases where the existence of the PRO
preprocedure or preadmission review processes discourages
practitioners from providing services.
Indeed, the simple existence of focused PRO reviews may
of itself articulate standards that substantially affect utilization
of medical services. Perhaps the most remarkable change in
Medicare-financed medical care over the last decade has been
the shifting of cataract surgery from inpatient to outpatient
settings. 14 5 One study found that this change alone accounted
for 54 percent of the decline in admissions in 646 hospitals
studied in 1984 and 1985,'4 and thus a substantial share of the
savings Medicare has experienced in payments for inpatient
hospital care since the adoption of DRG PPS. During the First
Scope of Work (1984-1986) many PROs focused their
preprocedure and preadmission reviews heavily on lens procedures. 47 Providers got the message, and rapidly accommodated the new standard by shifting cataract surgery to the
outpatient venue. Though relatively few procedures were in
fact denied, practice changed dramatically. 48
The PROs' quality review program may also have an
impact greatly disproportionate to that revealed by their minimal sanctioning activity. Though PRO corrective action plans
are carried out in secrecy and thus little noticed, PRO quality
sanctions have received notoriety in the medical press greatly
disproportionate to their volume. 14 9 In California and Texas
particularly, the highly-publicized adversarial stance of organ145. See McPhillips, Can the Elderly Afford Eyecare?, 94 OPHTHALMOLOGY 1199,
1200-01 (1987). On the shift of Medicare patients from inpatient to outpatient settings,
see generally LEADER, THE OUTPATIENT EXPERIENCES OF AGED MEDICARE ENROLLEES
1 (1990).

146. RUSSELL, supra note 28, at 28, citing DesHarnais, Chesney & Fleming, The
Impact of the Prospective Payment System on Hospital Utilization and the Quality of
Care: Trends and Regional Variations in the First Two Years (1987) (unpublished
manuscript).
147. RUSSELL, supra note 28, at 27; LOHR, supra note 54, at 25, 27.
148. The dramatic decline in inpatient cataract surgery was accompanied by an
even more dramatic increase in outpatient cataract surgery. See Leader & Moon,
Medicare Trends in Ambulatory Surgery, 8 HEALTH AFFAIRS 158 (1989). Though the
PRO program was effective in accomplishing its goal, its goal may have been too
narrowly drawn. The overall effect did not achieve cost savings for the Medicare
program as a whole.
149. See e.g. sources cited supra note 110; Schorr, PeerReview Battle Heats Up, 27
PHYSICIAN'S MGMT. 145 (1987); AMA Tries to Nip Regulation, HOSPITALS, Jan. 20, 1987,
at 94.
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ized medicine toward the PRO no doubt raised doctors' consciousness of the threat of PRO sanctions.
Moreover, PROs may sanction hospitals for substandard
care, and have in fact done so. Though only one hospital has so
far been excluded from Medicare under a PRO sanction, PROs
have brought 725 quality interventions against hospitals during
the third PRO contract period."W As Medicare finances 28 percent of hospital care, exclusion of a hospital from Medicare is a
disaster of the greatest magnitude. The threat of potential
PRO sanctions, as impressed upon a hospital through a PRO
quality intervention, has no doubt caused more than one hospital to take strong corrective action against the physician or
Thus hospital
physicians responsible for the problem.
response may act as a lens, magnifying the force of PRO quality initiatives.
In sum, the PROs' full impact on the utilization and quality of medical care is probably not reflected in the small
number of instances in which PROs deny payment for services
or sanction physicians or hospitals. Research that would fully
describe the effects of PROs on the utilization and quality of
medical care would be very useful but extraordinarily difficult
to conduct, given all of the other factors impacting on the
health care industry contemporaneously with the implementation of the PRO program. 151 Nonetheless, assuming that the
PRO program is more effective than it appears at first glance,
what can be done to make it even more productive?
IX.

AN AGENDA FOR IMPROVING PERFORMANCE OF THE COST
CONTROL POLICE

A number of considerations are essential for establishing
an agenda for improving cost control regulation. First, the
development of practice guidelines or similar articulations of
optimal processes for medical care is essential. 52 Such articu150. REsuLTs, supra note 64, at 12; OIG Report, supra note 82.
151. The GAO attempted such a study, but abandoned it in consideration of the
methodological difficulties involved. Interview with George Silberman. (October 19,

1990).
152. GAO, INAPPROPRIATE, supra note 85, at 22; PHYSiCIAN PAYMENT REV.
COMM'N, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (1989); Brook, Practice Guidelines and

Practicing Medicine: Are They Compatible?, 262 J. A.M.A: 3027 (1989); Chassim,
Standards of Care in Medicine, 25 INQUIRY 437 (1988); Furrow, supra note 34;
Mehlman, Assuring the Quality of Medical Care: The Impact of Outcome

Measurement and Practice Standards (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter
Mehlman]. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 officially endorsed the
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lations would assist the task of utilization and quality review in
several respects. Guidelines or protocols could in many
instances eliminate the need for regulatory intervention. As
the shift of cataract surgery from the inpatient to outpatient
venue illustrates, articulation of standards may in itself be sufficient to change practice. Articulation of standards may
largely eliminate the need for extensive case-by-case PRO
determinations of necessity, appropriateness, or standard of
care. The vast majority of cases could, given viable guidelines,
simply be disposed of with minimal review by reference to the
standards, with individual consideration focused on marginal
cases. Where appeals are brought for denials of non-standard
care, evidentiary issues would be greatly simplified. Presumptions could be used and expert testimony disposed of. The
recent commitment of federal resources to the creation of
practice guidelines is thus a very positive development to
improve utilization and quality review. Another step in this
direction is the imminent implementation of the Uniform
Clinical Data Set, which will permit the PROs to screen cases
applying a uniform set of computerized decision rules to a
more complete clinical data1 53set, enabling more objective and
systematic quality decisions.
Second, the recent emphasis on networking among review
entities could be quite helpful and should be encouraged as a
means of magnifying the effect of PRO interventions. The
1990 OBRA further encourages PROs to communicate with
state licensure agencies, a trend begun by OBRA in

19 86

.11

PROs and Part B carriers need to strengthen their communications to ensure that PRO-initiated Part A hospital payment
denials result also in Part B physician payment denials. 5 5 The
substandard care payment denial program, once implemented,
may result in PRO quality determinations triggering medical
negligence litigation by Medicare beneficiaries who are
informed that they have been the victims of substandard care.
Thus, the PRO quality review program is connected to another
concept of practice guidelines and established an agency to conduct and fund research
in formulating such guidelines. See Pub. L. 101-239 § 6103, 103 Stat. 2106, 2189 (1989).
153. See Lohr & Walker, The Utilization and Quality Control Peer Review
OrganizationProgram, II INSTITUTE OF MED., MEDICARE: A STRATEGY FOR QUALITY
ASSURANCE, 343, 388-94 (1990) (describing the UCDS).
154. Pub. L. 101-508 § 4205(d) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-3(a)(9), (9)(b)(1)); Jost, supra note 51, at 69.
155. See Jost, supra note 51, at 68.
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potent quality assurance mechanism: medical negligence
litigation.
Networking among quality assurance programs can have
several beneficial effects. It improves the quality and quantity
of information available to each regulator. A licensing agency
that learns of a potential quality problem with a doctor from a
report of a judgment in a malpractice case or a patient complaint can proceed more confidently with disciplinary action if
it learns that the PRO has independently taken action against
the doctor. It can also reduce repetition of action. Once the
OIG sanctions a physician for PRO identified quality problems,
the licensure board may be able to take disciplinary action
based strictly on the PRO action, without having to prove the
underlying case all over again. 15 Networking can enhance the
consequences-and thus the deterrent and incapacitation
effect-of the actions taken. There is fear that denial of payment for substandard care by PROs may provoke the filing of
malpractice actions. Substandard care denials, therefore, have
much greater force than they would have as simple payment
denials.

157

In particular, it is important that PROs work together
with hospitals, which are best positioned to oversee the practice of physicians on a day-to-day basis. PROs should notify
hospital medical staffs when they identify problem physicians,
and work together with the hospital in formulating correction
plans. All of these networking opportunities should magnify
the effect of PRO regulatory interventions.
Third, and perhaps most important for our purposes,
greater awareness of the impact of procedure-insofar as it
both limits and enhances program effectiveness-is necessary
in program design. We have already noted that procedural
protections currently available to providers under the PRO
statute and regulations constrain the aggressiveness of the
PROs and thus limit the volume of PRO interventions. At the
same time, however, we have also noted that the existence of
other procedural impediments may force providers to limit
utilization of medical care, consistent with PRO objectives.
Further discussion is, therefore, appropriate as to what proce156. See, e.g., OHIO REV. STAT. § 4731.22(B)(25).
157. See Hospitals Anxious Over Payment Denialsfor Quality, 61 HOSPITALS 48
June 20, 1987 (expressing this concern).
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dural protections providers are entitled to and what procedural
burdens they may be subjected to in dealing with the PROs.
Any obligation of the PROs to provide procedural due process is ultimately grounded in the fifth amendment of the
United States Constitution. The fifth amendment, however,
provides due process protection only against deprivations of
"life, liberty and property." The Supreme Court in Board of
Regents v. Roth'-98 concluded that property interests for purposes of invoking these protections are not created by the Constitution, nor do they exist wherever there is a unilateral
expectation of a benefit from government.1 5 9 Rather, property
interests are created by laws, rules, and mutual understandings
created by state and federal law.' 6°
Courts have differed as to whether a provider of medical
care has a property interest under federal or state law to sell
its services to the beneficiaries of public health care programs
such as Medicare and Medicaid. The issue has arisen most
commonly in situations where a provider or professional has
been suspended or excluded from the Medicare or Medicaid
programs.' 6' In this context, a few federal courts have explicitly found that property interests exist. 62 More have assumed
that such rights exist as a predicate to finding that adequate
procedural due process was in fact provided in the particular
case.
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Others have, however, explicitly found that providers are
158. 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972).

159. See also Geriatrics, Inc. v. Harris, 640 F.2d 262, 264-65 (10th Cir. 1981), cert
denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981).
160. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
161. Though this article is concerned with the Medicare program rather than the
Medicaid program, the application of constitutional requirements of procedural due
process apply similarly to both programs, so Medicaid as well as Medicare precedents
are cited and discussed here.

162. Case v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 602, 606 (2d Cir. 1975) (termination of nursing
home from Medicare); Patchogue Nursing Center v. Bowen, 797 F.2d 1137, 1144-45 (2d

Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030 (1987) (ban on Medicaid and Medicare admissions
to nursing home); Ram v. Heckler, 792 F.2d 444, 447 (4th Cir. 1986) (suspension of
physician from Medicare and Medicaid for Medicare fraud); Doe v. Bowen, 682 F.Supp.

637, 642 (D. Mass. 1987) (suspension of physician from Medicare and Medicaid);
Papendick v. Bowen, 658 F.Supp. 1425, 1431 (W.D.Wis. 1987) (two year exclusion of
physician from Medicare).
163. Ritter v. Cohen, 797 F.2d 119, 122 (3rd Cir. 1986) (termination of physician

from Medicaid); Doyle v. Secretary of HHS, 848 F.2d 296, 302 (1st Cir. 1988) (exclusion
of physician from Medicare for five years on recommendation

by PRO); Gruter

Found., Inc. v. Bowen, 652 F. Supp. 245, 253 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (termination of long term
care facility from Medicaid).
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not the intended beneficiaries of Medicare or Medicaid and do
not have a legitimate expectation of continued participation in
these programs.'64 To quote one recent case involving a
clinical laboratory suspended from the Medicaid program for
improper billing: "We recognize that plaintiff may encounter
considerable economic hardship in serving out this suspension.
That hardship, although unfortunate, is not of constitutional
significance under a Roth analysis since the provider is an incidental beneficiary under the Medicaid program ....165 Notably, the Second Circuit, which had provided leading precedents
for the position that Medicaid providers have a property interest in continued participation in the Medicaid program," has
recently cast serious doubt on this position in cases where .the
governing statutes permitted termination of a provider without
67

cause.1

Several courts have either explicitly recognized or conditionally assumed that terminating. a provider for incompetency
or fraud affects the provider's personal and professional reputation sufficiently to implicate a liberty interest.' 6 The ironic
implication of this position is that a provider terminated for
good cause, such as incompetence or fraud, may be entitled to
due process, whereas one terminated without cause may not
be, since its reputation is not put in jeopardy. 69 Other courts
have refused to find a liberty interest in these cases, especially
where there are no allegations of moral turpitude affecting
164. See Koerpel v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 858, 863 (10th Cir. 1986) (no property
interest in physician providing services to Medicare patients); Geriatrics, Inc. v. Harris,
640 F.2d 262, 264 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981) (no property interest in
nursing home participating in Medicaid); Cervoni v. Secretary of HEW, 581 F.2d 1010,
1018 (1st Cir. 1978) (no property interest in physician in reimbursement under
Medicare Part B); H.E.A. of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Bowen, 685 F.Supp. 13, 15 (D.Mass
1987) (no property right in nursing home in providing services to Medicare or
Medicaid).
165. Rockland Medilabs, Inc. v. Perales, 719 F. Supp. 1191, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
166. Case v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 602, 606 (2d Cir. 1975); Patchogue Nursing
Center v. Brown, 797 F.2d 1137, 1145 (2nd Cir. 1986).
167. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc. v. Perales, 878 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1989).
168. Varandani v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 307, 310 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1052 (1988) (physician suspended for one year based on recommendation of PRO in
response to medical care deficiencies); Koerpel v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 858, 866 (10th Cir.
1986) (physician suspended on the basis of PRO recommendation); Doe v. Bowen, 682
F.Supp. 637, 642-43 (D. Mass. 1987) (physician suspended for alleged Medicaid fraud);
Papendick v. Bowen, 658 F. Supp. 1425, 1431 (W.D.Wis 1987) (physician excluded for
two years for substandard care.)
169. Kelly Kare v. O'Rourke, 751 F. Supp. 1154, 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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personal reputation.
Where the issue does not concern participation in a health
care benefit program, but rather payment at a particular level
or for particular kinds of services, it is even more difficult to
find that a provider has a property or liberty interest. The case
of Friedrich v. Secretary of Health and Human Services'7 '

involved a challenge to the refusal of the Medicare program to
pay for chelation therapy, a controversial treatment for atherosclerosis. As a precedent to examining the plaintiff's due process challenge, the court considered whether the plaintiff
beneficiary had a property right in payment for chelation therapy. The court stated:
The Supreme Court has defined those property interests
entitled to constitutional protection as "more than a unilateral expectation;" instead, a claimant must have "a legitimate claim of entitlement to property" [citing Roth]... The
only legitimate claim of entitlement under Medicare is to
those services that are reasonable and necessary (citations
omitted). There is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a
given medical procedure172just because a doctor prescribes it
or a patient requests it.

The court then noted that HHS had consistently and
clearly rejected chelation therapy as a "reasonable and necessary" service over a period of time, and thus there was no basis
for the plaintiff to claim an entitlement protected by due
process.

173

Even where courts have assumed or found a property or
liberty interest, they have generally afforded agencies administering health benefits programs considerable procedural flexibility. Applying criteria articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge1 74
the courts consider (1) the private interest at stake, (2) the risk
of erroneous deprivation of the protected interest through the
procedure employed and the benefits of additional procedural
170. Id. See also Roller v. United States Department of Health and Human
Services, Civ. No. 8-86-338 (D. Nev. 1986).
171. 894 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 59 (1990).
172. Id. at 838.
173. Id. See also New York State Ophthalmological Soc'y. v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 1379,
1391 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1098 (1989) (no constitutional right in
Medicare beneficiaries to choose the number of surgeons participating in cataract
surgery absent definite showing of medical necessity); American Medical Association v.
Bowen, 659 F.Supp. 1143, 1150 (N.D. Texas 1987) (physicians do not have a property
interest in Medicare payment rates set at a particular level.)
174. 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
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protections and (3) the government's interest, including the
additional burden to the government of additional procedures.
Though the risk of erroneous deprivation and the benefit of
additional procedures vary from case to case, the courts tend to
weigh heavily the government's primary responsibilities for
guarding beneficiaries from incompetent care and protecting
health care programs from unnecessary costs, and put little
weight on the interest of providers in continued ability to provide services financed by the programs.
Even assuming, therefore, that a professional or provider
has either a property or a liberty interest in Medicare program
participation as such, and thus cannot be terminated without
due process, entitlement to payment for any particular service
should depend on the provider's or professional's ability to
establish that the service was rendered in accordance with pro176
gram requirements of necessity, appropriateness and quality.
To the extent that the Constitution requires due process before
disallowing payment for a service or excluding a provider or
professional from Medicare, the Mathews v. Eldridge calculus
permits agencies considerable latitude in crafting appropriate
procedures, given the importance of the government interests
involved.
The procedural flexibility available to the PROs is also not
limited significantly by the liability threats that increasingly
daunt private utilization review efforts. In several recent cases
private utilization reviewers have been threatened with tort
liability when they have denied payment for care subsequently
found to have been necessary. 1 77 Potential tort liability does
not, however, create a significant barrier to aggressive action
on the part of the PROs. PROs are shielded by statute from
liability for decisions made with due care. 7 ' Some courts have
175. See Varandani v. Bowen, 824 F.2d at 310-11; Ritter v. Cohen, 797 F.2d 119, 12324 (3rd Cir. 1986); Patchogue Nursing Center v. Brown, 797 F.2d 1137, 1145 (2nd Cir.
1986); Papendick v. Bowen, 658 F.Supp. 1425, 1431-33 (W.D.Wis 1987).
176. In the vast majority of cases, of course, it will be unnecessary for the provider
to prove that the care was rendered in accordance with program requirements. Where
the care is challenged, however, the provider, not the program, should bear the burden
of establishing compliance.
177. See Hughes v. Blue Cross of Northern California, 215 Cal. App. 3d 832, 263
Cal. Rptr. 850 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 2200 (1990); Wilson v. Blue Cross of
Southern California, 222 Cal. App. 2d 660, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1990); Wickline v. State
of California, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Cal. App. 1986), review denied,
239 Cal. Rptr 805, 741 P.2d 613 (1987).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-6.
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gone even further, finding absolute immunity.17 9 This is not to
say that PROs should be careless or cavalier in their utilization
review decisions. They should always be cautious to avoid decisions that might result in harm. Liability concerns, however,
need not cause them to engage in "defensive" utilization
review.
PRO regulatory procedures should be designed to take full
advantage of the flexibility PROs enjoy under the Constitution
and under tort immunity provisions alternatively to overcome
procedural inertia or to enhance their own effectiveness. For
utilization review, this could mean, on the one hand, minimizing procedural barriers to payment for procedures provided in
compliance with necessity and appropriateness requirements.
On the other hand, procedural barriers to payment could be
increased for procedures identified as likely to be abused or
falling outside of practice guidelines, or for physicians or providers identified by profiling as overutilizers.'8 0 The Uniform
Clinical Data Set might be a useful tool for identifying such
procedures or professionals.' 8 ' The PROs could require, for
example, additional documentation, perhaps second opinions,18' for questionable procedures. The burden of convincing
the PRO that payment is appropriate should be borne by the
professional or institution in these cases.
When review is focused on under-service or other quality
problems, the PROs have less scope for manipulation of procedures. The consequences of a PRO's finding a quality deficiency are much more significant than are those of a
utilization-based payment denial, particularly if the PRO sanctions the provider or rotifies a state licensing agency of the
problem. A quality-based sanction or even denial of payment
(as distinguished from a utilization review intervention) could
179. Kwoun v. Southeast Missouri Professional Standards Review Organization,
811 F.2d 401, 407 (8th Cir. 1987); Woods v. Freedman, CCH Medicare and Medicaid
38,230 (D.C. So. Dist. Ill. July 31, 1989); but see Dozier v. Professional Foundation for
Healthcare Inc., (D.C. Fla., Dec. 1989) (Florida PRO and medical director assessed
$150,000 for

notifying

patient

of quality

problem

without

providing

physician

opportunity to comment), cited and discussed in Gosfield, Utilization and Medical
Review, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF HOsPITAL ArrORNEYs AND NATIONAL HEALTH
LAWYERS ASS'N, ELEvENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON MEDICARE AND MEDICAID PAYMENT
ISSuES 4 (1990).

180. See Mehiman, supra note 150 (advocating a similar procedural structure for
outcome-based quality review).
181. See Lohr & Walker, supra note 37, at 200-201.
182. COBRA 1985 required second opinions for ten procedures, Pub. L. 99-272,
§ 9401, 100 Stat. 82, 196. This provision has not yet been implemented.
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have a profound effect on a physician's reputation if it becomes
known. Because a PRO quality intervention is based on the
judgment of a professional's peers, it should have greater
impact on the physician's reputation than the judgment of a
lay jury in a malpractice case."s It may result in hospital or
licensing disciplinary action that can destroy a physician's practice. Quality-based actions that later prove unfounded can be
the source of much resentment and ill-feeling.
Even here, however, if the program is to be effective, procedural barriers to enforcement should not become insurmountable. It is appropriate that in the first instance the PRO
or OIG bear the burden of proving that a physician is not rendering care of acceptable quality. It might also be appropriate,
however--once it is established that the physicians performance has fallen substantially below standards in several
instances-for the burden then to shift to the physician to
establish his or her competence generally. This is similar to
the approach taken by some state licensing boards that require
a physician to establish competency by passing the SPEX exam
(perhaps after some retraining), once it is established that the
physician has performed below standard in one or more
instances. 84 Correction plans currently serve this purpose to
some extent. Perhaps, however, the physician should bear the
burden of showing compliance with a corrective action plan
once the PRO has established the initial necessity for quality
intervention.
Finally, consideration should be given to greater reliance
on deterrence in the PRO program. Though the difficulty that
attends many judgments of necessity, appropriateness and
quality of medical care justify the dominant corrective, rather
than deterrent or punitive, approach of the program, there are
undoubtedly some circumstances where standards are so
clearly breached that public condemnation is appropriate. In
OBRA 1990 Congress amended the PRO statute to specify that
PROs had to establish the inability or unwillingness of an
institution or professional to comply with a correction plan as a
183. For example, as the supervisory member of the Ohio Medical Licensing
Board, the author takes more seriously reports of PRO quality interventions than
malpractice reports in determining the appropriateness of initiating disciplinary action.
184. The State Medical Board of Ohio, of which the author is a member, has
required a passing grade on the SPEX as a condition of readmission to practice in a
number of cases where the physician's license has been suspended on the basis of
competency.
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condition of sanctioning the provider only "where appropriate. 1 8 5 Under this amendment, the PROs can, therefore, sanction providers for some quality deficiencies without affording
an opportunity for correction. Where clear breaches of standards are evident, sanctions without opportunity for correction
are appropriate, and, if publicized, might have deterrent effect.
HHS should promulgate regulations specifying when sanctions
without opportunity for correction might be appropriate.
Similarly, where institutions or professionals bill Medicare
for services that are clearly unnecessary or inappropriate (as
judged, for example, by their deviation from practice guidelines) it may be fitting not only to refuse to pay for the service,
but also to impose a civil fine, measured by some multiple of
the improper bill. This parallels what is done with false claims
under Medicare fraud and abuse,' 8' and would magnify the
effect of PRO utilization review denials.
X.

CONCLUSION

Public cost-containment in the United States has relied on
payment methods that attempt to limit increases in the price
or intensity of medical services. These payment methods, however, can have undesired side-effects, encouraging the over- or
under-provision of medical care. The federal government has
responded to this problem with several regulatory programs,
one of which, the PRO program, was explored here. Though
the interventions of the PRO program directed toward stemming over- or under-provision of services seem unimpressive,
the indirect effect of the program may be much more significant. Paradoxically, while procedural requirements may
explain the paucity of PRO activity, procedural barriers may
also be the lens through which the effects of the relatively
insignificant level of PRO activities have been magnified.
Fuller understanding of the positive and negative effects of
procedural requirements; better direction of procedural inertia
through the development of practice guidelines; and enhancement of the effectiveness of PRO actions through networking
and more conscious attempts at deterrence of undesired behaviors, might assist in improving the PROs' policing of cost
containment.
185. Pub. L. 101-508, § 4205(a)(1) to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(b)(1).
186. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(1)(A).
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AFTERWORD

As this essay goes into print in the Spring of 1991, The
Health Care Financing Administration, preparing for the
Fourth Scope of Work, is seriously challenging the effectiveness of PRO preadmission review." 7 HCFA argues that
preadmission review has resulted in minuscule rates of denials
and has not impeded continued growth in the number of procedures performed per month at a rate far in excess of the rate
of beneficiary growth. HCFA suggests that the requirement
for preadmission review by the PROs be eliminated while the
rate of random sample retrospective review be increased.
The procedural inertia model developed in this essay
would predict the phenomena HCFA observes in its position
paper. Under preadmission review, a PRO denial usually
means that the beneficiary will be denied the reviewed service.
(This is in contrast to retrospective review, where denial usually means that the provider will not get paid, but the service
has already been delivered). Preadmission denials, therefore,
maximize the likelihood of beneficiary requests for reconsideration and appeals. Moreover, if a service is denied, and the
beneficiary subsequently suffers from lack of the service, the
PRO may receive adverse publicity, or at least a Congressional
constituent inquiry. Thus the PRO faces great incentives to
approve preadmission review requests.
The provider, on the other hand, has little reason not to
request a service on a preadmission review basis. If the service
is denied, the provider loses nothing other than the time it
took to make the request. If is approved, and the procedure is
rendered, the provider is wealthier, and the beneficiary, it is
hoped, healthier. Thus preadmission review discourages PRO
denials, but does little to discourage provider requests, and,
accordingly, growth in the rate of service use. Thus this paper
would support HCFA in its proposal to decrease preadmission
review and increase random retrospective review.

187. See, Health Care Financing Administration, Background and Future
Direction of the PRO Program (unpublished manuscript, Jan. 25, 1991); discussed in
HCFA Turns Thumbs Down on PRO Sentinel Effect, 19 MED. UTILIZATION REV. 2, 4
(1991).

